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As  part  of  an  overall  strategy to  induce  private  funding  and  provision  of
infrastructure services, governments have offered support to  investors in  the form  of
grants,  loans and  guarantees.  These  supports have  often been provided  through an
institutional approach of specialized financing facilities.  A prelimninary  stocktaking of the
experience shows that these facilities have often fallen short of their intended objectives
mainly  for  two  sets  of  reasons:  (i)  a  lack  of  a  conducive  environment  for  private
participation in  infrastructure-poor  sector policies,  unstable political  environment, a
poor macro-framework and inadequate financial sector policies-and  (ii) faulty design of
the  facility  itself-inconsistent  objectives,  instruments,  and  pricing  of  instruments,
sectors targeted.WHY INFRASTRUCTURE  FINANCING FACILITIES OFTEN
FALL SHORT OF THEIR OBJECTIVES
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BBLIOGRAPHY  ... 36I.  EXECUTIVE  SUMMARY
1.  Governments worldwide are seeking to increase private capital flows to a broad
range of infrastructure sectors. However, private sector involvement, most notably within
the emerging markets, has been limited due to investor unwillingness to assume many of
the commercial, financial and political risks surrounding these large-scale undertakings.I
In addition to the risk profile of the project and sector in question, additional factors that
will determine private sector involvement in infrastructure include the following:
*  the development status of the enabling legal and regulatory environment;
*  market structure (natural monopoly vs. multiple potential providers);
*  macroeconomic conditions;
*  financial, technical and institutional capabilities of the host government and
relevant state-owned enterprises;
*  availability and quality of information required by investors to conduct due
diligence undertakings;
- tendering process utilized (structured vs. unstructured, competitive vs. direct
assignment); and
- liquidity of local financial markets.
2.  As part of their overall strategy to induce private funding and provision of these
services, governments have sought to  attract private investment by offering support to
investors, often in the form of of grants, soft loans, or guarantees. 2 A growing number of
governments have developed an institutional approach to providing such support.  This
institutional approach, referred to hereafter as Infrastructure Financing Facilities (IFFs)
appear to offer a number of benefits, including the following:
*  leverage Government and donor funding;
- reduce transaction costs by offering a wholesale approach for allocating donor
support for smaller-scale infrastructure financings;
*  increase transparency and consistency to evaluating and allocating government
support; and
*  allow for portfolio diversification. 3
For the purposes  of this discussion  risks are classified  according  to the following  categories:  political-
currency  convertibility  and transferability,  parastatal  breach  of contract,  changes  in law and trade  regimes,  revocation
of permits,  expropriation,  war,  sabotage,  etc.;  financial-Financial  market  interruptions,  interest  rate and exchange  rate
fluctuations,  prepayment;  and commercial-Construction  delays  and overruns,  increases  in operations  and maintenance
expense,  changes  in prices  of inputs  and outputs,  availability  and quality  of fuel  supply,  contractor  insolvency,  etc.
2  However,  govemments  can also attempt  to address  the policy  problems  that underlie  investors'  concerns  by
raising  prices  to cost covering  levels,  ensuring  macro  stability,  and establishing  a sound  macro-framework.  See for a
detailed discussion on instruments: Dailami, Klein (1997).
3  However, country  funds will have only very limited possibilities of  diversifying risks  as  infrastructure
projects tend to be lumpy and thus the fund in effect may not finance more than  10 to 20 projects.  In addition,
empirical evidence shows that returns in infrastructure projects tend to be highly correlated and correlate with national
income.  For example, electric power, highways, waterways, airports and postal services are all positively correlated
with national income. See for more detail: Bailey, Jensen, 1972.2  Why Infrastructure  Financing-Facilities-Often Fall Short of Their Objectives
3.  IFFs effectively  serve as a wholesale mechanism to channel either direct  funding
in the form of equity, senior and subordinated debt and grants and/or contingent support
(e.g.  political  risk  guarantees  or  refinancing  commitments).  They  are  typically
government owned entities and are housed in commercial banks, public agencies or set up
as shell companies (see Table 1).
Table 1:  Overview of Government Sponsored Infrastructure  Funds
Country  Sector  Ownership Structure/  Management  Instrument  Funding Base
(Status)  Legal Structure  Structure
Bangladesh  *  Cross-Sectoral  *  100%  public  *  Public, but  *  Mezzanine  *  Proceeds  of WB
(operational  in January  *  Set up as non-bank  exempted  from  financing  US$225  million
1998)  financial  institution  public sector rules  loan
and regulations
Colombia  *  Initially  toll  *  100%  public  Public  *  Refinancing  *  Proceeds  of WB
(under  development  since  roads, others on a  *  housed  in two  commitments  US$100 million
1995)  as-needed  basis  institutions:  a state-  *  Liquidity  loan
owned bank and public  Support
= _________________  Lsector  agency 
Shareholding
India  *  Multi  Sectoral  *  Mixed  *  Private  *  Mezzanine  capital of US$278
(operational  in January  *  set up as non-bank  financing  million
1998)  financial institutions  *  Senior loans  *  Subordinated
*  Contingent  loans of  US$168
instruments  million
*  Junior loans
and equity
Jamaica  *  Multi Sectoral  *  100%  public  *  Public  *  Mezzanine  *  Proceeds  of WB
(canceled)  *  Housed in a state-owned  financing  and IDB loan  of
bank  US$81 million
loan
Mexico  *  Multi Sectoral.  *  100%  public  *  Public (Banobras)  *  Junior equity  *  Proceeds  from
(canceled)  *  Housed in a state-owned  privatization
bank  revenues  of
._______________  ______________  US$225  million
Pakistan  *  Energy  *  100%  pubEic  *  Public  *  Mezzanine  *  Proceeds  of loans
(ongoing)  *  Housed  in a  financing  from bi- and
govermment-owned  multi-lateral
bank  donors  of US$900
______________________  ________________________  ____________________  m  illion
_  Telecom
Philippines  *  Transportation  *  75% private & 25%  *  Private  *  Equity  *  Over five year
(canceled  at concept  stage)  *  Water, Port, Rail  public  *  Mezzanine  period expected to
*  Set up as a separate  financing  aise US$5  bilElon
entity  in local and-
foreign currency3  Why  Infrastructure  Financing Facilities  Often Fall Short of Their Objectives
Country  Sector  Ownership Structurel  Management  Instrument  Funding Base
(Status)  Legal Structure  Structure
Sri Lanka  *  Multi Sectoral  *  100%  public  *  Public  *  Mezzanine  *  Proceeds  from WB
(recently  canceled)  *  Set up as a separate  financing  US$70 million
entity  loan and KfW loan
of US$14 million
Thailand  *  Cross-Sectional  *  Public and private  *  Private  *  Loan  *  US$150 million
(operational  since 1994)  guarantee;  from government;
bond  USAID,  domestic
insurance  and foreign
financial
institutions
Source:  World  Bank  reports.
Table 2:  Overview  of Other Government  Sponsored  Financing  Facilities
Country  Sector  Ownership  Structure/  Management  Instrument  Funding  Base
(Status)  LeIgal  Structure  Structure
Argentina  *  Financial  Sector  *  100%  public.  *  Private  *  Refinancing  *  Proceeds  of WB
(canceled)  *  Set up as a shell  commitments;  US$500 million
company  . loan;
Bosnia  *  Pre-export  *  100%  public;  *  Public  *  Pre-export  *  Proceeds  of WB
(operational  since  *  Set up as a separate  partial  risk  US$10 million
December 1996)  corporate entity  guarantee;  loan; plus US$5
million from
Switzerland.
Moldova  *  Pre-Export  *  100%  public.  *  Public  *  Pre-export  *  WB contingent
(canceled)  *  Set up as a shel  political risk  line of credit of
company  guarantee.  US$30 million.
Source: World Bank  reports.
4.  This paper attempts  to take stock of some of the cross country  experiences  with
IFFs via desktop review,  evaluates  their preliminary  success  and attempts  to draw  some
initial  lessons.  It  provides  examples  of  infrastructure  funds/facilities  with  varying
institutional  arrangements,  sources of funding,  sector(s) targeted, instruments  offered  and
policy orientations.  The  success  of the facility  will be determined  by assessing  whether
the facility has (i) minimized and leveraged government's  involvement  in the financing of
infrastructure  projects;  (ii)  increased  the  efficiency  of  sector  development  through  the
provision  of a transparent  and systematic review  of eligible  projects;  (iii) allocated  risks
to those parties best able to manage them (i. e. distance  the government  from commercial
risks);  and (iv) provided a transitional  mechanism to facilitate the closing  of a number of
benchmark  transactions.4  - Why Infrastructure Financing Facilities Often Fall Short of Their Objectives
5.  For the purposes of conducting this  analysis, three case studies  were selected
featuring IFFs at different stages of development. Each case was chosen to exemplify the
various types of policy issues that can arise in the design of an IFF that may adversely
affect the success of the iFFs. The cases were also selected so as to evaluate whether the
success of the facility was related to the types of  instruments offered. The three case
studies include (i) Colombia, (ii) India; and (iii) Pakistan. Two of the IFFs presented,
Colombia and India, were at the conceptual stage at the time this study was undertaken.
As there is limited experience with the use of contingent instruments in infrastructure
financing facilities, two other government sponsored financing facilities not geared at
infrastructure-the  Argentine  and  Moldovan  government  sponsored  facilities-were
included  in  the  study  given  their  wholesale  approach  and  focus  on  utilization  of
contingent instruments.
6.  The  preliminary  analysis of  the  three  IFFs  and  the  two  other  government
sponsored facilities shows that these facilities have often fallen short of their intended
objectives mainly for two sets of reasons: (i)  a lack of a conducive environment for
private  participation  in  infrastructure-poor  sector  policies,  unstable  political
environment, a poor macro-framework and inadequate financial sector policies-and  (ii)
faulty design of the facility itself-inconsistent  objectives, instruments, and pricing of
instruments, sectors targeted.
7.  Conducive  Environment  for  Private  Participation  in  Infrastructure.  The
decisions as to whether companies will enter a market are dependent on the tariff and
regulatory framework as  well  as  on  the  stability of  the  macro-framework, political
stability and adequate financial sector policies.  To ensure that government resources are
not  used over the long  term to  simply compensate private investors  for gaps  in the
regulatory framework,  an  appropriate legal  and  regulatory  framework  coupled  with
adequate enforcement mechanisms and secure property rights should be  in place.  An
insufficient regulatory and legal framework will tend to increase the cost of capital to
investors and may thus adversely affect the commercial viability of projects.  In the worst
of cases, private capital flows may simply not be available at any cost. Over the short-
term, the government may use the  IFFs as a  transitional tool to  bring  a  number of
benchmark  transactions  to  financial  closure  and  affirm  the  legal  and  regulatory
framework. To avoid a permanent subsidy, IFFs should be set up as transitional tool.
8.  It should also be noted that building up a track record may prove to be a useless
exercise, if a government change can result in the new government reneging on contracts
or reversing decisions of the "old" government.  In addition, the scarcity of long-term
capital is often used as a justification for governments to establish an infrastructure fund.
Yet, while a government sponsored debt fund may temporarily mitigate a lack of long-
term resources, it does not tend to resolve the underlying causes for under developed or
undeveloped capital markets, i. e. unstable macro-policies and inadequate financial sector
policies.  Finally,  if  the  government  employs contingent  instruments  to  foster  the
development of financial markets (i.e. jump-starting the primary market  in long-term
bonds via put options  for local  investors), it should ensure such  development is  notS  Why Infrastructure Financing Facilities Often Fall Short of Their Objectives
hampered by regulatory restrictions (e. i. are institutional funds allowed to invest also in
non-investment grade securities).
9.  Adequate Design Features of Facility.  The analysis presented also illustrates that
the IFF's success was also adversely affected by micro-level issues relating to its design
including inconsistent objectives, an inadequate institutional framework, and inadequate
design parameters.
10.  Develop Clear and Consistent Objectives.  The cross country analysis suggests
that public-sector counterparts should develop clear and consistent objectives on which to
base the design of the facility as some objectives could work at cross purposes.  For
example, the Government may want to  achieve such development objectives via the
facility as expanding liquidity, lowering funding cost by offering credit enhancements,
better  allocating risk between the government and the private  sector, developing the
domestic capital market, improving the quality of service and increasing competition.
However, governments will be unable to pursue all of these objectives at the same time.
A better allocation of risk between the private and public sector may lead to higher risk
exposure of the private sector, which in turn may reduce private resources flowing into
infrastructure. 4 In  addition,  government  should  avoid  mixing  commercial  and
developmental objectives as instruments for the latter may feature required pricing at
levels  that may not  allow for  a  market return.  Moreover,  to  provide effective and
efficient  support to  private participation in infrastructure on  a  transitional basis,  the
design parameters of the IFF should be consistent with the policy environment.
11.  Understand Investor Requirements. As experience presented in the paper further
reveals, to ensure that the design of the facility is offering instruments that addresses the
impediments to  private  participation in  infrastructure, the  government  may  want  to
conduct a  thorough demand survey.  A  demand or broader market  survey may also
provide guidance to the government on the following issues:
*  to identify the nature and magnitude of the financing gap;
*  the appropriateness of the fund as an instrument to support private investment
and the timing of the fund;
*  the design of instruments;
*  the 1FF funding requirements; and
*  the staffing levels and skill mix needed to manage those instruments.
12.  Nevertheless, the development of  such funds tends to be  a  complex and time
consuming process, especially if contingent instruments are offered as the facility may
need to build up institutional capacity. In the meantime, given that developing countries
tend to be  vulnerable to  shocks, economic conditions may change and  may adversely
4  Nevertheless, at the same time, government may have implemented a set of policy reform that improves the
overall regulatory environment and allow, among other things,  for cost covering tariffs.  This would in turn reduce
govemments' the need for the govemment to offer financial support to attract private resources into the sector.6  Why Infrastructure Financing Facilities Often Fall Short of Their Objectives
affect the usefulness of the instruments if they cannot be adapted in structure to the new
economic environment. 5
13.  Develop Institutional Framework that is in Line with Objectives of Fund.  The
facility needs adequate institutional capacity and an effective organizational structure,
independence in its decision making process and technical support in the start up face to
ensure that the facility builds up adequate technical capacity.
14.  Experience with IFFs shows that financial engineering cannot substitute for the
lack of sound policy, only open or disguised government subsidies can.  The question
then is which approach to project finance levers government funds with respect to reform
efforts and not with respect to other funds. Country experience does indicate that good
reform will eventually bring in those as well but there is not enough of a track record to
confirm this empirically at this point in time.
As the Argentine  case study also illustrates,  it is very difficult to restructure  these instruments,  as the
instrument  structure  is rarely flexible  enough,  itself  a reflection  of the rigidity  associated  with  donor funding  in support
of such  initiative.7  Why Infrastructure Financing Facilities Often Fall Short of Their Objectives
II.  INTRODUCTION
15.  Private Participation in infrastructure (PPI) has risen substantially over the last ten
years and today, increasing from about US$16 billion in 1990 to U$S 120 billion in 1997.
For developing countries, PPI-financing averaged 15 to 20 percent a year. Private activity,
however, has been concentrated in  relatively few countries. Middle income  countries
have attracted most private activity; among low-income countries only China and India
have attracted  substantial  private  investment. In other  regions,  notably  Sub-Saharan
Africa, the  number  of  countries  with  projects  with  private  participation  has  been
increasing, but private activity remains limited. In 1998, ten countries accounted for 74
percent of all investments in infrastructure projects (Argentina, Brazil, China, Hungary,
India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mexico and Thailand).6
16.  Why  the  move  to  Private  Participation  in  Infrastructure  (PPI). 7 Physical
infrastructure projects have been traditionally financed with public funds and operated by
public  entities.  Driven  by  fiscal  austerity  and  widespread disenchantment  with  the
performance of  state-owned utilities, 8 innovations  in  technology  and  policy, 9 many
governments are turning to the private sector to build, operate, finance, own, and transfer
telecommunication facilities, power plants, ports and airports as well as toll roads.  In
industrialized countries, the move to PPI is toward restructuring or unbundling integrated
industry structures, introducing competition and choice (particularly in the electricity and
telecommunications industry) and regulating those parts of the infrastructure sector where
elements of natural monopolies exists.  In the developing world the picture is more mixed
and reflects the different levels of achievements in institutional, regulatoiy and policy
developments.
17.  Barriers  constraining  effective  private  involvement  in  infrastructure.  Many
developing  countries  are  now  in  transition  to  private  provision  of  infrastructure.
Nevertheless, effective private involvement in emerging economies is still hampered to a
varying degree by the following factors: an inadequate legal and regulatory framework, 10
6  Roger  (1999).
7  See for  more  detail:  Klein,  Roger  (1994).
8  According  to the World Bank, developing  countries  currently spend about US$200 million a year on
infrastructure  development.  The  large  investment  needs  in infrastructure  place an enormous  burden  on public  finances
and is probably  unsustainable  over  the long  run, especially  in Asia  where  infrastructure  investment  needs  are estimated
to be around  $ 1.2-1.5  trillion  over  the next  decade  World  Bank. However,  due to the financial  crises  that  the region  is
grappling  with  which  will  adversely  affect  GDP  growth,  these  figures  need  to be adjusted  downwards.  Figures  cited in
World  Bank (1994)  and World Bank (1996), Infrastructure  Development  in East Asia and Pacific:  Toward  a New
Public-Private  Partnership.
9  A rethinling of the traditional  doctrine  of publicly  owned  utility  monopolies  has led to innovations  in the
regulatory  arena, notably  the unbundling  of natural monopolies  into network facility and potentially  competitive
activities,  the separation  of ownership  from service  provision  and new  forms  of service  provision.
10  This includes a need for more conducive  sector  policies,  particularly  regarding  pricing, competition,  and
public  monopolies.  Moreover,  in the area  of tariff  policy,  an increase  in tariffs  to full economic  cost is a precondition
for ensuring the financeability  of private infrastructure  projects.  This may, however, include the elimination  of
subsidy-induced  distortions  that involves  major adjustment  in the tariff structures. In developing  countries,  annual
subsidies  from  underpricing  water,  power, and rail services  are estimated  to amount  to US$120  billion annually  which
amounts  to (very  roughly)  about one third of total annual  overall  investment  in infrastructure  services  in developing
countries  or US$350  billion.  World  Bank.8  Why Infrastructure Financing Facilities Often Fall Short of Their Objectives
poorly  structured  concession and  contractual  arrangements, high  transaction costs,'"
political risk, and a lack of an established reputation and track record from the part of the
government.  The financing of such projects is encumbered by weak domestic capital
market that rarely, if ever, are willing and able to support the infrastructure investment
needs facing most  developing countries, an  unstable macro-framework that  increases
interest rate risk, and a below-investment grade sovereign credit rating limiting access to
international capital  markets  for  infrastructure projects  (as  domestic  companies  and
projects cannot receive a credit rating that is better than the sovereign rating.12 Indeed, of
the US$15 to 20 trillion available for funding from institutional investors, only around
300 million are slated for investment in non-investment grade securities which will be
divided between purchasing sovereign or Brady bonds, other company and infrastructure
bonds. 13
18.  Due to  the large  sunk costs,  which can take from  10 to  30  years to  recoup,
associated with infrastructure projects and their various risks,14 private investors have
been  hesitant  to  invest  in  emerging market  economies  with  high  country  risk  and
unproven  regulatory  regimes  unless  supported  by  host  governments  through  tax
incentives and some sort of financial support intended to improve the cash flow or reduce
risk. 15 Economic justification for government support to infrastructure projects mainly
evolve around the following four sets of arguments:
*  incomplete information or information asymmetries on the government's
macro and regulatory- policy between public and private agents;
*  the Government's ability to better pool and spread risks which would put it in
a better position to fund infrastructure projects and lower its cost of capital;
*  agency costs between equity- and debtholders and between equity holders and
managers; and
*  the Government may have inside (or superior) information compared to other
market participants.
19.  However, theory suggests that imperfections associated with capital markets in
financing infrastructure provide only limited justifications for government intervention.
While guarantees may be used as instruments to complete imperfect contingency markets,
they involve considerable disincentives on their own. For example, credit guarantees will
In the US, contraction  and bidding  cost amount  typically  up to two to three.  percent of total project  cost,
whereas  these  costs  tend to  range from  ten to 15  percent  in emerging  markets. See also:  Klein,  So, Shin, 1996.
12  While  rating agencies  have still to break with this tradition,  investors  in some Latin  American  countries  are
pricing corporate  lower than the sovereign  in the secondary  market.  See for detail: Swafford,  1997.  In another
development,  credit  rating  agencies  hope to expand  their business  into  project  finance  and encourage  project  sponsors
to obtain  a rating  on their  project  with  which  then will  be used by commercial  banks,  multi-lateral  and bilateral  lenders,
investment  banks and institutional  investors.  See  for more  detail:  Gopinath,  1997.
13  In developed  and developing  economies,  mutual  funds,  insurance  companies  and pension  funds are often
prohibited  by regulation  to invest  in non-investment  grade  securities.  Figures  cited  after  Klein, 1997.
14  These  are expropriation  risk,  demand  risk,  payment  risk,  exchange  and interest  rate risk,  and political  and
regulatory  risk. See for a detailed  discussion:  Irwin,  Klein,  Perry,  Thobani  (1997).
15  However,  as Klein  (1997)  points  out government  guarantees  or support  is not required  in jurisdictions  with  a
well-developed  policy  framework  and a stable  macro  economic  environment.  Klein, 1997.9  Why Infrastructure Financing Facilities Often Fall Short of Their Objectives
provide disincentives to  the private  sector for  performance, maintenance and  further
investment (Mody, Patro 1996). Furthermore, governments' true cost of capital may not
be lower than that of the private sector if taxpayers were to be compensated adequately
for the risks they assume.  In addition, there seems to be no comparative advantage of the
government in risk bearing and risk pooling.  Finally, neither do appropriate mechanisms
exist with which the government can credibly signal inside information nor  are there
adequate mechanisms of  public intervention with  which the  government can  correct
failures in capital markets that are due to agency costs. 16
20.  While justifications for government support to infrastructure appear limited, a
case could be made for transitional mechanisms to jumpstart private sector involvement
in infrastructure by helping to bring a few benchmark transactions to closure to validate
the untested policy framework-catalytic  role of government support-and  to mitigate
specific risks  of  infrastructure projects  which  private  investors  can  neither  manage
efficiently nor transfer.
21.  Governments have mainly used one  of three mechanisms  to provide financial
support to  infrastructure projects via provision of (i)  direct financial support through
subsidized loans (senior subordinate), equity contributions or grants; 17 (ii) provision of
contingent supports such as political risk, minimum revenue, construction cost overrun or
debt refinancing guarantees, 18 and (iii) government sponsored infrastructure financing
facilities.
22.  In  recent  years,  government  sponsored  infrastructure  funds  have  enjoyed
increasing  popularity  in  emerging  market  economies  and  have  been  increasingly
employed by Governments (see Table  1).  On the  surface they appear  to be  a  good
instrument for government intervention in the financing of infrastructure as they feature a
number of advantages that appear to be in  line with the core principles of  providing
government support. In general, funds may have advantages, as they:
*  leverage Government and donor funding;
*  reduce transaction costs by offering a wholesale approach for allocating donor
support for smaller-scale infrastructure financings;
16  See for  more  detail:  Hoffinann-Burchardi,  Klein,  Mas (1996).
17  Note that subsidies  may be structured  as lower than market interest  rates, longer repayment  periods and
average  life not offered  by private  investors,  subordinate  claims  on project  security  and collateral  packages,  etc.
IS  However,  explicit  govermment  guarantees  bring with them undesirable  consequences  as they reduce the
incentives  of firms to run projects  efficiently,  weaken  market  screening  and while they relieve current government
budgets,  they also shift obligations to future periods and as many of these guarantees  become effective  during
recessions  they may  trigger  a new style  of debt crisis. See for more  detail:  Engel,  Fischer,  Galetovic  (1998)  and Lewis,
Mody,  (1998).10  Why Infrastructure Financing Facilities Often Fall Short of Their Objectives
*  increase transparency and consistency to evaluating and allocating government
support; and
*  allow for portfolio diversification. 19
23.  The proliferation of government sponsored financing facilities raises the following
questions:  Have  government-sponsored funds  been  successful  in  attracting  private
investment?  What other objectives have government tried to achieve with infrastructure
funds and have funds proven to be the appropriate tool? What are the advantages of an
infrastructure fund compared to other form of government support?  If this instrument is
effective for achieving demonstration effects, what demonstration were actually sought
versus  those  that  were  actually  achieved?  Are  there  any  preconditions  for  the
establishment of a fund?  What are the important design parameters?  Is a government
sponsored infrastructure fund a more efficient way to  provide government support to
infrastructure financing? Is it an appropriate way of providing government support?
24.  The paper will take stock of cross country experience with infrastructure financing
facilities  and attempts to  assess the preliminary success of this  form of  Government
support to  financing infrastructure.  In particular, it will examine what  country case
studies can tell us about the different types of funds, their objectives, instruments and
pricing, results of existing funds and lessons learned.
25.  The remainder of  the paper is  organized as  follows.  Section 3  provides  an
overview of cross country experience with  government sponsored financing facilities.
Section 4 will analyze in greater detail specific case studies. The analysis will encompass
design objectives and design parameter of the fund, present the results  and finally the
lessons from that country case.
19  However, country funds  will have only very limited possibilities of  diversifying risks  as  infrastructure
projects tend to be lumpy and thus the fund in effect may not finance more than  10 to 20 projects.  In addition,
empirical evidence shows that returns in infrastructure projects tend to be highly correlated and correlate with national
income.  For example, electric power, highways, waterways, airports and postal services are all positively correlated
with national income.  See for more detail: Bailey, Jensen, 1972.11  Why Infrastructure Financing Facilities Often Fall Short of Their Objectives
III.  CROSS-COUNTRY  EXPERIENCE  WITH  INFRASTRUCTURE
FUNDS/FACILITIES
26.  The  following  tables  present  a  survey  of  twelve  government  sponsored
funds/facilities for which more detailed information was available, and an overview of
their respective design parameters.  Table  3 provides information on  nine financing
facilities that focus on promoting private participation in infrastructure.  Table 2 entails
information on three other government financing facilities of which two were designed to
support export activities and one was aimed at promoting capital market development.
27.  Ownership/Management Structure  of  Facilities.  Regarding  the  ownership
structure of the facilities contained in both tables, nine facilities are owned by the public
sector while three have mixed, i. e. public and private ownership.  While  government
funds may be justified to provide "transitional" and "catalytic" support to infrastructure,
their intended limited life span was not reflected in their legal structure.  Only two of the
publicly owned funds were set up as shell companies that can easily be dismantled.  The
rest  were  established on  a  more permanent basis, i.  e.  either  as  non-bank  financial
institutions or as part of an existing government-owned bank. 20 The majority of facilities
were also managed by the public sector, reflecting the fact that the decisions made by the
fund have potential fiscal implications and can therefore not completely be handed over
to the private sector. 21
28.  Instruments offered  by Facilities.  The variety of  instruments  offered by the
facilities shows that they were targeted at different sectors and thus at projects that faced
different impediments in attracting private capital.  Nevertheless, half of the funds offered
blunt direct funding instruments-including  junior equity, and  mezzanine financing-
which suggests that government concluded the lack of long-term finance to be a major
impediment to attracting private investment.  Only half of the funds offered contingent
instruments  that  can-if  structured  correctly-be  more  specifically  targeted  at
commercial, financial and  political  risks  that  private  investors may  be  unwilling  to
assume. For example, in one case, the facility offered refinancing commnitments  aimed at
financial market interruption risk.
29.  Funding Base.  The World Bank supported the majority of the funds-nine  out of
twelve-and  almost all of the funds relied on government financing which  may be a
reflection of their developmental focus.  Out of twelve funds, only one intended to raise
additional money from the capital markets.
20  As the Colombian case later will show, housing the facility in a government owned bank may give rise to a
set of problems that is linked to the differing objectives of the institutions.  While the facilities may have clearly
defined developmental objectives, public banks, in general, overall pursue commercial objectives.  The difference in
objectives will have repercussions on the pricing of the instruments. While the facility may want to price access to the
instruments at levels that encourage their usage, public banks may want to price the instruments at levels that not only
insulates them as much as possible against commercial risk but also allow them to make a profit.
21  As will be discussed in greater detail later, the public sector should rely on the technical expertise of the
private sector by hiring consultants that provide support on technical issues.  But it needs to reserve the right for itself
to make the final decision to mitigate the risk of conflict of interests.12  Why  Infrastructure  Financing  Facilities  Often Fall Short  of Their  Objectives
30.  Results/Track Record.  Out of nine IFFs in our sample, three were in operation at
the point in time this study was written.  Five facilities were already canceled indicating
the complexity of policy issues facilities have to resolve to be successful and one facility
was still in development (see Table 3).
Table 3:  OVERVIEW OF GOVERNMENT SPONSORED INFRASTRUCTURE FUNDS
Country  Sector  Ownership  Structure/  Management  Instrument  Funding  Base
(Status)  Legal  Structure  Structure
Bangladesh  *  Multi-Sectoral  *  100% public  *  Public,  but  *  Mezzanine  *  Proceeds  of WB
(operational  in January  *  Set up as  non-bank  exempted  from  financing  US$225 milion
1998)  financial  institution  pubhc  sector  rules  loan
and  regulations
Colombia  *  Initially toll  *  100% public  *  Public  *  Refinancing  *  Proceeds  of WB
(under development  since  roads, others on a  *  housed  in two  commitments  US$100  million
1995)  as-needed basis  institutions:  a state-  *  iquidity  loan
owned bank  and public  Support
sector  agency  X
*  Shareholding
India  *  Multi-Sectoral  *  Mixed  *  Private  *  Mezzanine  capital  of US$278
(operational  in January  *  set  up as non-bank  financing  million.
1998)  financial  institutions  *  Senior  loans  *  Subordinated
*  Contingent  loans  of US$168
instruments  million
*  Junior  loans
and  equity
Jamaica  *  Multi-Sectoral  *  100% public  *  Public  *  Mezzanine  *  Proceeds  of WB
(canceled)  *  Housed  in a state-owned  financing  and ADB loan of
bank.  US$81  millon
loan
Mexico  *  Multi-Sectoral.  *  100% public  *  Public (Banobras)  *  Junior  equity  *  Proceeds  from
(canceled)  *  Housed  in a state-owned  privatization
bank.  revenues of
US$225  million
Pakistan  *  Energy  *  100% public  *  Public  *  Mezzanine  *  Proceeds  of loans
(ongoing)  *  Housed in a  financing  from bi-  and
government-owned  multi-lateal
bank  donors of US$900
milion
*  Telecom
Philippines  *  Transportation  *  75% private  & 25%  *  Private  *  Equity  *  Over five year
(canceled  at concept  stage)  *  Water, Port, Rail  public  *  Mezzanine  period expected to
. Set up as  a separate  financing  raise US$5 bilion
entity  in local and
foreign  currency
Sri Lanka  *  Multi-Sectoral  *  100% public  *  Public  *  Mezzanine  *  Proceeds  from WB
(recently canceled)  *  Set up as  a separate  financing  US$70  millon
entity  loan and KfW loan
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Country  Sector  Ownership Structure/  Management  Instrument  Funding Base
(Status)  Legal Structure  Structure
Tbailand  *  Multi-Sectoral  *  Public and private  *  Private  *  Loan  *  US $ 150  million
(operational  since 1994)  guarantee  from govemment;
bond  USAID,  domestic
insurance  and foreign
financial
institutions
Source: World Bank reports.
Table  4:  OVERVIEW OF OTHER GOVERNMENT SPONSORED FINANCING FACILITIES
Country  Sector  Ownership Structure/  Management  Instrument  Funding Base
(Status)  Lekal Structure  Structure
Argentina  *  Financial  Sector  *  100%  public.  *  Private  *  Refinancing  *  Proceeds  of WB
(canceled)  *  Set up as a shell  commitments  US$500 rillion
company  loan
Bosnia  *  Pre-export  *  100%  public  *  Public  *  Pre-export  *  Proceeds  of  WB
(operational  since  *  Set up as a separate  partial risk  US$10  million
December 1996)  cotporate  entity  guarantee  loan;  plus US$5
million  from
Switzerland
Moldova  *  Pre-Export  *  100%  public  *  Public  *  Pre-export  *  WB contingent
(canceled)  *  Set up as a shell  political  risk  line of credit of
cornpany  guarantee  US$30 million
Source: World Bank reports.14  Why Infrastructure Financing Facilities Often Fall Short of Their Objectives
IV.  CASE STUDIES
31.  Due  to  their  potential  advantages-lower  transaction  cost,  leveraging  of
government funds-infrastructure  facilities, at least on a theoretical level, appear to be a
potentially more efficient way to  provide government support during the transition to
private provision of infrastructure. But how successful have these funds been in practice?
Have they strengthened reform efforts by the government in the regulatory framework?
Have they been able to  attract private investment or have they indeed facilitated the
transition  to  private  provision  of  infrastructure?  Have  the  facilities  used  the  right
instruments?  Has the scarcity of long-term financing been an important impediment to
private investment in infrastructure and have the facilities employed adequate instruments
to mobilize more long-term financing resources? What lessons can we learn from recent
experiences? The following analysis of case studies attempts to answer these questions.
32.  Methodology of Paper.  The analysis will extend to three infrastructure financing
facilities and two entities targeted at other sectors of the economy as valuable lessons can
be drawn from these experiences.  For each case a systematic description of the facility
including  its  objectives,  instruments  applied,  pricing  of  instruments,  institutional
framework and operative arrangements is presented.  This is followed by an assessment
of the results.  The analysis concludes with a brief review of lessons learned.
33.  Evaluating Outcomes.  As  noted, government  sponsored funds/facilities  may
allow for more efficient use of public resources.  A more efficient use of public of public
resources can be measured in terms of three performance indicators which center on the
extent  to  which  government  assistance  provided  by  the  funds/facilities:  (i)  attract
additional investment by serving  as  an  enabler of  commercially viable  projects that
otherwise may not have been financeable; (ii) reduce cost to project sponsors and to users
of facilities or equipment that are financed in part from a financing facilities, 22 and/or (iii)
bring  beneficial  projects to  completion  earlier than would  have  been the  case with
traditional financing.
34.  Evaluation Criteria. Due to their recent inception and the long gestation period of
the projects they are targeting, the following analysis focuses on assessing the success of
the facility on the basis of qualitative criteria.  Does the fund: (i) minimize and leverage
government's  involvement in the financing of  infrastructure projects; (ii) increase the
efficiency of sector development through the provision of a transparent and systematic
review of eligible projects; (iii) allocate risks to those parties best able to manage them (i.
e.  distance  the  government from  commercial risk);  and  (iv)  provide  a  transitional
mechanism to facilitate the closing of a number of benchmark transactions which helps to
improve and affirm the working, legal and regulatory environment for the sector.
22  However,  the reduction  in cost is brought  about not by offering  financing  at below market  rates.  On the
contrary,  the financial  viability  of projects  is improved  through  the enhancement  of their security  package  and/or  cash
flow for the direct benefit  of long-term  debt providers  (without  exposing  the government  to commercial  risk). This
should  result  in a direct  improvement  in the financing  terms  (tenor,  pricing  timing)  available  to the project.15  Why Infrastructure Financing Facilities Often Fall Short of Their Objectives
35.  Lessons Learned.  The analysis concludes with a review of what lessons can be
drawn from the case study to determine necessary preconditions, if any, for establishing
infrastructure financing facilities and to learn what factors in the design of the facility are
crucial to ensure the success of a financing facility.
36.  Sources for  the Analysis.  Only published sources (i. e. World Bank reports) or
interviews with experts familiar with individual facilities were employed.  In the future,
as greater attention is focused on providing efficient government support to infrastructure,
there is hope that quantitative data will be available.
37.  Selection of  Cases for  Detailed Analysis.  We selected three IFFs for a  more
detailed analysis that  were  at a  different  stage in  the development of  the facility to
exemplify various types of policy issues that may arise in the design of the facility and
may adversely affect its success.  The three IFFs are (i) Colombia, (ii) India, and (iii)
Pakistan.  As  there  is limited  experience with  the use  of contingent instruments by
infrastructure financing facilities, two government sponsored facilities targeted at non-
infrastructure sectors which had a track record with contingent instruments were included
in the analysis. These are (iv) Argentina, and (v) Moldova.
A.  Colombia: "Infrastructure  Facility" 23
38.  Rationale  and  Objectives.  During  the  last  several  years,  the  Colombian
govemment, as part of its "Economic Modernization Program", has attempted to improve
resource allocation by attracting private sector investment in infrastructure while focusing
public resources in social sub-sectors.  In support of this policy a number of laws were
passed in the transport, energy, telecommunications, and  water sanitation sub-sectors
during 1993 and 1995.  Moreover, the government has been working on setting up an
infrastructure facility to (i) increase private capital flows to the infrastructure sectors, (ii)
improve the conditions of debt financing, and (iii) better allocate risk between public and
private enmities.
39.  Sectors Targeted and Instruments offered.  At the time  of the drafting of the
paper, it was envisioned that the facility would start on a pilot basis in  the transport
sector.  It was envisioned to extend the reach of the facility to other projects once the
regulatory and policy environment of other sector was considered adequate. 24 The facility
would offer three instruments to  be  provided by  two  separate entities:  (i)  local  and
international market refinancing commitments, and (ii) a put options for local investors,
and (iii) a liquidity support facility (available in US$ and local currency).
40.  Local and international market refinancing commitments are call options targeted
at financial market interruption risk and jump starting the development of the (local) debt
market for limited recourse financing.  They provide a commitment from the facility to
23  For  more  detail see:  The  World  Bank,  Report  No. 17154-Co,  January  1998.
24  At that stage, any projects  that are tendered  by the Colombian  Government  through  a competitive  bidding
project  are  eligible  for subscription  to the facility's  instruments.16  Why Infrastructure Financing Facilities Often Fall Short of Their Objectives
project sponsors to refinance their debt if the project raises debt from the market that is of
shorter maturity than its contract.  It would benefit the equity holder as the commitment
implies  a default  guarantee.25 To  insulate the facility from commercial risk, project
sponsors can exercise the option if the project is in compliance with a set of performance
indicators.2 6
41.  The put  option is  aimed at jump-starting the primary market  in  securities by
offering investors the chance to  sell the securities at a  steep discount to  the facility.
Under a put option, the facility provides to investors of infrastructure projects a "liquidity
of last resort" facility.  The project sponsor or borrower is unaffected as the terms and
conditions of his  loans remain unchanged.  To  avoid muting investors'  incentives to
monitor the project and insulate the facility against commercial risk, investors can only
exercise the put option if the project satisfies specific performance criteria.
42.  The liquidity support facility offers coverage under the project's concessional and
contractual arrangements against payments delays or defaults by public sector entities and
would only be callable if the public sector entity failed to meet its payment obligation and
such failure would result in debt service default of the project company.  This bridge
financing is intended to be offered during 12 to 18 months while the budgetary request is
being processed and funded by the government.
43.  Pricing.  The  fees-up-front,  commitment,  and  annual  fee-of  the  two
instruments will be set to encourage access to these instruments and recover costs.  The
interest rates of the instruments will be set at lender of last resort levels so as to ensure
that they are only exercised as a last resort.
44.  Institutional Set Up. The instruments were to be provided by two facilities housed
in two different public sector institutions. 27 The refinancing commitments and the put
option will be offered by a facility housed in Bancoldex, a government owned export
bank which will be responsible for the administration including the bidding process, the
marketing  and  servicing  of  existing  instruments  and  liability  management.  The
international refinancing commitments will be backstopped by the World Bank.  The
liquidity support facility will be housed in Invias, the public sector transport agency, and
managed by Invias personnel.
25  Upon exercise of the instrument, Bancoldex would extend bridge financing directly to the project company
that would then apply the proceeds to pay down outstanding debt with its lenders.  The term  of the refinancing
proceeds would be determined in relationship to the project's cash flow generation and debt servicing capacity.  The
repayment schedule could not extend the term of the concession agreement.
26  For example, the project must maintain a minimum specified investment grade credit rating (e. g. BBB- or its
equivalent local currency rating) with no published negative outlook for at least 12 months prior to the drawing of the
refinance commnitment.  The project must also maintain a minimum debt service coverage ratio.
27  At first, it was intended that both instruments be offered through a facility housed in Bancoldex.  However,
Bancoldex did  not want to be exposed to the government non-payment risk.  Thus, it was decided to provide the
liquidity support facility through Invias.17  Why Infrastructure Financing Facilities Often Fall Short of Their Objectives
45.  Funding  Base.  Initially,  the  international refinancing  commitment  and  the
liquidity support instrument would be backstopped by a World Bank contingent line of
credit of about US$80 million.
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46.  Results. The design phase of the facility has been a long drawn out process due to
a lack of government coordination, the long lead time between the demand survey and the
final implementation of the facilities and inconsistencies between developmental
objectives being pursued by the government and commercial objectives being pursued by
Bancoldex, the public banks in which the facility was to be housed.
47.  Lessons  Learned.  The  Colombian  case  study  offers  best  practice  in  three
important  aspects:  (i)  employment  of  a  detailed  demand  analysis  that  identifies
impediments to private investment in infrastructure, (ii) provision of a limited number of
instruments that are well targeted at specific non-commercial risks, and (iii) leverage of
govemment funds.  Nevertheless, it also highlights some of the problems governments
face when setting up these facilities.
48.  The concept of the facility and the design of the instruments were based on a
detailed  demand  analysis,  which  helped  to  initially  identify  obstacles  to  private
investment in infrastructure. However, the survey was not of sufficient detail to provide
specific information as to the underlying factors that are constraining private capital flows
to that sector.  For example construction risk which was identified as a key impediment
for private investment in toll roads. Yet the information gathered in the survey was of
insufficient detail to  identify  specifically what part of  the  construction risk  was the
constraining factor.  And the facilities was to offer  a limited number  of instruments
targeted at specific risks-financial  market interruption-and  aimed at achieving a better
risk allocation between the private and public sector and allowing the project company to
insure itself against those aspects of the refinancing risks it has little control over.  By the
same token, as the exercise of the refinancing option is linked to good performance, the
facility is insulated against such risk over which they have limited control, commercial
risks.  The limited number of instruments in combination with the limited number of
sectors targeted also mitigate demands on the organizational structure and on internal
technical capacity and make the management of the facilities more manageable from the
government's point of view.
49.  Nevertheless, the Colombian case also exemplifies some of problems that arise in
the design phase of a government infrastructure sponsored financing facility and may
adversely affect the effectiveness of this form of government assistance to infrastructure.
A large amount of government and donor resources have been spent during the design
phase and have yet to yield concrete results.  The high implementation and design costs
can partly be attributed to a lack of government coordination.  The different government
agencies involved in the endeavor failed to establish good channels of communication
early on in the process and decide which of the government agencies is to take the lead in
designing  and  setting  up  the  facility.  The  lack  of  ownership  on  the  part  of  the
government agencies and ministries involved and the lack of a champion for the project
advancing the project through the different bureaucratic processes let the project languish.
50.  In addition, long gestation periods of financing facilities entail the risk that the
results  of the  demand survey (which is  aimed  at identifying impediments to  private19  Why Infrastructure Financing Facilities Often Fall Short of Their Objectives
participation in infrastructure) on which the concept of the facility is based are no longer
valid.  In  the interim  period, economic or  (political) conditions  may have  changed
rendering the instruments offered by the facilities less useful to private  sponsors (see
Argentine example).
51.  Moreover, the Colombian experience also highlights a  more subtle point. All
government entities involved in the initiative should have a consistent set of objectives.
The  government's  longer-term  developmental  objectives,  i.e.  local  capital  market
development, carried direct pricing and risk allocation implications for the instruments
offered.  However, the government decided to house the facility in a government-owned
bank, which was pursuing short-term commercial objectives and was apprehensive of
assuming projects with  longer-term time horizon. Problems arising from  government
entities pursuing different policy objectives are difficult to resolve (i. e. liquidity support
facility).
B.  India: "Infrastructure  Development Finance Company Limited (IDFC)" 28
52.  Rationale/Objectives.  The expansion and efficient use of infrastructure is fast
becoming one  of  India's  key  development issues.  Implementation  of  public  sector
infrastructure projects  have  generally been  slow,  with  frequent  cost  overruns  and
inadequate construction quality.  Moreover, public resources are limited and will not be
able to  finance necessary investments. Against this  background, the Government has
introduced some reforms in the policy, legal and  administrative framework to  attract
private  investment.  The  government  has  also  sponsored  the  establishment  of  the
Infrastructure Development Finance Corporation (IDFC) that broadly speaking seeks to
stimulate private and long-term local funding for infrastructure projects. According to its
developmental objectives, IDFC  seeks to create new financial instruments and project
implementation structures to increase capital flows and enhance the terms and conditions
of funding for infrastructure projects. At the same time, IDFC is pursuing commercial
objectives seeking a market return on its investments.
53.  Sectors  Targeted/Instruments.  At the  time of  writing  this  report, IDFC  was
intended to have a cross-sectoral orientation, targeting the power, telecommunications,
ports, toll roads and municipal services sector. Yet during its first two years of existence
IDFC was to concentrate on the power and telecommunications sectors.  Likewise, IDFC
instruments were to focus principally on the provision of direct funding instrument in the
form of: co-financing via long-term debt, preferred and common equity for greenfield
projects, as well as refinancing of existing local currency debt. 29 Then IDFC was to
gradually move into the water, transport and urban finance sectors, offering instruments
aimed at improving the terms and conditions of third party debt offerings like take out
financing,  contingent  refinancing  commitments,  put  options  and  bond  insurance.
According to its commercial objectives, IDFC was to price its instrument to ensure a
28  See for more  detail:  Infrastructure  Development  Finance  Company  Limited,  Draft - Business  Plan, May 3rd
1997.
29  Direct funding  and refinancing  is projected  to amount  to 64 and 19 percent of total assets,  respectively,
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market  return  and  may thus  run  the  risk  of pricing  its  instruments  (that  are  more
developmental in nature) so as to discourage their utilization by third-party financiers.
54.  Institutional Set Up.  IDFC is set up as a non-banking financial company 30 with
mixed, but  mainly public sector ownership. 31 It  is managed by a Board of Directors
consisting of  three  professional and  eight part-time  directors-representing  different
shareholders-as  well as one full time- non-executive director who will assume the role
of chairman.  The chairman also chairs the IDFC Infrastructure Policy Advisory Group.
The day-to-day  responsibility for the management of the IDFC rests with the managing
director who will have responsibility for implementing the policies established by Board
of Directors and for the hiring and managing of staff.  As remuneration packages are
market based, IDFC should be able to compete with the private sector and attract high-
caliber people.
55.  Funding Base. IDFC has three major sources of funding: (i) equity; provided by
government, multilateral and private entities, (ii) a subordinated loan extended by the
Government of India and the Reserve Bank of India, and (iii) debt financing (which will
mainly be focused on the local domestic market) with emphasis on wholesale funding. Its
injected equity and mezzanine debt financing amounts to around US$400 million.  In
order  to  allow  institutional  investors  to  invest  in  IDFC  bonds  or  increase  their
attractiveness, the following regulatory changes needed to be made: (i) list infrastructure
sector as priority sector for banks; as a result IDFC bonds would also qualify within the
quality sector target of bank,  (ii) notification of new categorization of investment for
Provident Funds, Superannuation and Gratuity Funds wherein they would be required to
invest in notified AAA rated infrastructure bonds with maturity of over ten years and
more, and (iii) modification of insurance regulation to specifically enable and earmark
utilization  of  insurance  deposits  for  investment  in  infrastructure  related  equity/debt
instrument of IDFC.
56.  Activities.  At the time of the drafting of this report, IDFC was still in the start-up
phase  as  it  only  recently  had  opened for  business  officially  (December  of  1997).
However, it appeared that  it very  soon may come under  pressure to  support private
projects  with its  resources in  ways that may not  be  in  line  with  its  developmental
objective and provide an efficient way of using public resources.  For example, IDFC
provided contingent, revolving and subordinated lines of credit to cover cost overruns and
traffic shortfalls for one toll road during the first seven years during which the project was
to  generate insufficient  cash  to  service  its  senior  debt  service  payment  obligations
(making it junior to subordinated debt).
30  As such its needs to be registered in a separate category and in view of the nature of its business would
necessitate separate standard for income recognition, asset classification and provisioning.  IFDC is envisioned to
follow more stringent accounting rules close to international standards.
31  Government of India and Reserve Bank of India holds 35 percent of total capital; 5 percent are held by the
Industrial Development Bank of India; 25 percent are held by other domestic financial institutions; and the remaining
35 percent are held by overseas institutions and multi-lateral agencies.Li  IIi  .
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57.  Lessons Learned.  In its  future operation IDFC is  facing the  following three
challenges that may adversely affect its success: (i) balance its countervailing catalytic
and commercial objectives, (ii) target its services on limited sectors and a limited number
of instruments, and (iii) resolve the potential conflict of interest in its policy advisory
role.
58.  As  noted,  IDFC's  conflicting developmental and  commercial objectives  may
hamper its ability to price instruments that are more developmental in nature so as to
encourage their  usage  by third-party financiers.  Conversely, it  may shy  away from
contingent and specifically targeted instruments, at would be of value added and are not
provided by the marketplace, and instead concentrate on higher-yield and relatively more
available traditional debt and equity investments.  Direct lending products also do not
tend to allow the government, which has an equity participation in the fund, to minimize
and leverage its involvement and insulate itself against risks over which it has no control
(commercial risks).
59.  The development and design of IDFC's financial products has yet to be based on a
thorough demand side analysis. Such an analysis could help to clearly identify gaps in the
legal and regulatory framework that jeopardize the commercial viability of projects, risks
that the private sector is  not  willing to  take  on, the type of instruments  that would
mitigate those risks, and the demand for products and instruments. This would help IDFC
to target and leverage its support and maximize its impact while at the same time keep its
own internal technical capacity and organizational needs at a manageable level. The large
number of sectors IDFC intends to service in combination with the large number and
diverse types  of  instruments  will  impose  a  high  burden  on  its  management  and
necessitate staff with a diverse mix of skills that is relatively scarce in India.
60.  But IDFC is facing another challenge.  The viability of  its project  pipeline is
jeopardized by gaps in the legal and regulatory framework. For example, the financial
closure of IPPs in the power sector is hampered by a number of factors including (i) a
lack of creditworthiness of the State Electricity Boards, (ii) vague and politicized tariff
setting and adjustment procedures, (iii) unclear dispatch criteria, and (iv) inadequate fuel
supply and transportation agreements. Before these legal and regulatory issues have not
been resolved, there may be little demand for IDFC's  instruments. By the same token,
IDFC may face some pressure to provide financing instruments or broad guarantees that
compensate the project sponsors for the inadequacies with the regulatory framework so
that these projects can be brought to financial closure.
61.  Finally, IDFC faces potential conflicts of interests in its policy advisory role to the
government vis-a-vis required legal and regulatory reform in the targeted sectors.  The
trade-off between structuring bankable transactions and promoting economic efficiency
could be blurred as IDFC attempts to balance the divergent interests of the private and
public sector counterparts.23  Why Infrastructure Financing Facilities Often Fall Short of Their Objectives
C.  Pakistan: 'Private Sector Energy Development Fund (PSEDF)" 32
62.  Rationale and  Objectives.  Beginning in  the late  1980s, the  Government  of
Pakistan has attempted to encourage private sector participation in infrastructure to shift
the burden of infrastructure investment from the public to  the private sector.  To that
effect, the Government started to gradual reforms in the energy sector.  As its ability to
attract foreign investment in the sector was hampered by the country's poor credit rating
it set up the Private Sector Energy Development Fund.  The fund was to pursue the main
following developmental objectives: It was aimed at (i) mobilizing resources for the co-
financing of private sector investments in energy development by providing a catalytic
function for private equity and loan financing, and (ii) setting an institutional framework
to sustain private investment and operation in the energy sector.
63.  Sector  Targeted/Instruments/Pricing  of  Instruments.  The  fund  provided
subordinated loans for projects in the energy sector. Between 1989 and 1994, the funding
furnished by the facility was subsidized in two ways: (i) the (fixed) nominal interest rate
was below market levels but positive in real term, and (ii) the loans carried an eight year
grace period 33 plus a very favorable exchange rate insurance offered by the State Bank of
Pakistan transferring the exchange rate risk to State Bank. 34 While the long grace period
remained in place after the program was restructured in  1994, interest rates were more
closely aligned with markets rates and sub-projects covered foreign exchange and interest
rate risk.  Nevertheless, the pricing structure was so complex and World Bank specific
that  projects  encountered difficulties  if  they  attempted  to  hedge  their  interest  rate
exposure. 3 5 When this difficulty was noticed, the World Bank and the Government of
Pakistan agreed to  provide a  market based  fixed interest rate  option  (i. e.  which is
equivalent  to  an  interest  rate  swap).  To  maximize  leverage  and  encourage  the
mobilization of commercial bank loans, the fund financed a maximum of 30 percent of
project costs.  Following established practices in  limited  recourse finance,  the Fund
required that the  borrowers establish  service escrow accounts  to  be  held  at levels
sufficient to meet six months debt service requirements.
32  The World Bank, Report No. P-6347-PAK, 7226-PAK, P4807-PAK.
33  Typically, the grace period covers the construction period, which range between three to four years.  An
eight-year grace period allows equity holders to receive returns on their investment before creditors are serviced. In the
Paldstan case, the eight year grace period was designed to flatten the overall amortization profile of debt and to prevent
the front loading of the tariff allowing the government to negotiate a power tariff which was "flatter" and, thus imposed
less of a payment shock to the power consumers.
34  The exchange rate insurance was not  linked to the PSEDF but  was in existence in Pakistan before the
foundation of PSEDF.
35  The complex pricing structure made it difficult to find a counterpart for the hedge. When this difficulty was
noticed, the World Bank and the Government agreed to provide a market-based fixed interest rate option (i. e. which is
equivalent to a commercial interest rate swap).24  Why Infrastructure Financing Facilities Often Fall Short of Their Objectives
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64.  Institutional Set-Up.  The fund is administered by the Private Energy Division
(PED), an autonomous unit set up within the government-owned "National Development
Finance  Corporation". 36 PED's  administrative  responsibilities  included  the
administration and operation of the fund, the valuation of projects and negotiation of loan
terms and extension of loans for approved projects, monitor projects and management of
the risk exposure of the fund.  As such PED did not have stand alone decision making
capacity but final project approval was subject to prior review and approval by the World
Bank.
65.  Originally, Government support to the fund was to be transitional as the fund was
to be used to allow the government to build up a track record and gradually implement
the necessary reforms in the tariff pricing structure.  To ensure the temporary nature of
government support, a sunset clause determined that the fund be spun off from NDFC
and privatized after 1995 which up to today has not taken place.
66.  Funding Base. Total fund volume amounted to US$1 billion and was provided by
donors agencies in two tranches (1989 and 1994).  The largest contributors to the fund
were  the  World  Bank  (US$400  million)  and  JEXIM  (US$400  million).  Other
contributers included USAID, US Eximbank, the Governments of Italy and France, and
the Bank of China.
67.  Technical Assistance.  The World Bank, as well as the USAID, provided technical
assistance to  the private  power and infrastructure board (PPEB), which was aimed at
improving the institutional capacity of regulatory authority.  PPEB  was set up as a one-
stop shop and was to coordinate government agencies' activities with the private sector.
Technical  assistance  under  a  different  project  was  also  provided  to  NEPRA,  the
regulatory authority in the power sector.
68.  Activities.  The Pakistan fund is one of the few government sponsored financing
facilities that has been able to support projects through financial closure.  After years of
relatively low activity, the fund has provided US $ 840 million to five projects with a
total project size of US$2.9 billion in its nine years of existence.  The largest projects
financed were HUB (US$1.5 billion total project size) and Uch (US$600 million total
project size) power projects.  These projects received funds in  the amount of US$433
million and 187.5 million or 62 percent of the fund's resources.37
69.  Lessons learned.  The Pakistan experience illustrates the  following two main
points: (i) an adequate policy framework as well as a satisfactory country credit rating are
crucial to attract private financing on a commercial basis, and (ii) direct funding exposed
the facility (and thus the government) to commercial risks.
36  While NDFC was solvent at the time of the establishment of the Fund, its financial standing deteriorated over
the course of the ten years since the inception of the Fund.  Its financial distress has adverse repercussion on the fund.
37  Both projects were also backed by World Bank partial risk guarantees: US$240 million commercial loan to
and a US$75 million to Uch.  While the original loan to Hub from PESEDF was US$615 million, including US$110
million in standby financing, only US$433 was drawn down as Hub was completed under budget.26  Why Infrastructure Financing Facilities Often Fall Short of Their Objectives
70.  The concept of the fund was based on the assumption that the lack of long-term
financing  was the  binding  constraint to  increasing private  investment  in  the power
sector. 38 While Pakistan's  domestic financial markets did indeed lack long term capital
resources, it is unclear whether the lack of long-term finance was the main obstacle to
attracting private investment (on a commercial basis). 39 The 1994 private power policy
program was very successful in bringing IPP to financial closure (19 EPPs  were brought to
financial closure), although this was achieved at a cost.  The Government was only able
to bring projects to financial closure by offering subsidized financing or other types of
government  guarantees  and  other  financial  and  non-financial  advantages  to  project
sponsors such as tax exemptions, an advantageous tariff structure, and noncompetitive
bidding process. Subsequent to the initial drafting of the report, the government asked for
renegotiations of the deals indicating that significant deficiencies in the regulatory and
policy  framework exists  that  hamper  the  efficient  use  of  private  and  government
resources in this area.40
71.  While the facility attracted on average four additional dollar in equity and loans in
funding,  the direct  funding  instruments offered by  the fund  expose  the  government
(fundlfacility) to commercial risk without having control over the management of that
risk. 41 Similarly, while the government shares in the downside risks of a project, it is
unable to take advantage of any upside potential.  Moreover, direct funding instruments
may be successful in attracting equity investment, but they may reduce project sponsors'
incentives to manage risk adequately, if it is provided on an unconditional basis as they
are somewhat protected. They may even tempt project sponsors to misbehave and pursue
riskier projects. 42 Finally, while the fund was supposed to act as a catalyst for initiating
private sector investment in infrastructure with a limited time horizon, it appeared that it
created a  situation  where private  sector investment may have become  dependent on
government backed finance as the existence of the fund may have taken the pressure off
the government to improve the regulatory framework to such a degree that government
backing was needed to a lesser degree to attract private financing.
38  It should  also be noted here that the provision  of long-term  financing  resources  was  hampered  by an unstable
macro-environment.
39  In this context, a  demand survey may have helped the government  to  identify obstacles to private
participation  and may  have  given  important  input  in the designing  the financing  facility.
40  This policy was meant to be transitional. The bulk tariff structure  under the policy was intended  to be
transitional  and GOP was to reform  its policy creating  a competitive  bidding  structure  and adjusting  tax exemptions
and incentives  provided. Nevertheless  the Government  did not undertake  these  sector  reforms  (which  it had agreed  to
in a parallel  project  with  the World  Bank. The  current  problems  are a result  of a number  of factors  including  the stalled
reforms  in the sector,  a sharp  economic  downturn  that substantially  reduced  the demand  for power  and the government
had overestimated  power  needs  which  resulted  in an oversupply.
41  Commercial  lenders  use loan convenants  to exert control  over management  or require  them to behave in a
fashion  that is in line with  the borrowers  interest  of repayment  of the loan. NDFC  has tried to mitigate  this risks by
being  presented  on the boards  of all projects  it finances.
42  See for  a detailed  discussion:  Klein  (1997).27  Why Infrastructure Financing Facilities Often Fall Short of Their Objectives
D.  Argentina: "Capital  Market Development Backstop Facility" 43
72.  Rationale. In the early 1990s, Argentina's capital markets suffered from a scarcity
of long-term resources that was mostly attributed to: (i) caution by investors about the
sustainability of more recent stabilization efforts against the legacy of macroeconomic
instability, (ii) an inadequate regulatory and supervisory framework, and (iii) a lack of
institutional investors."  The development of private securities markets was considered to
be important to help muster the large amount of medium and long-term financing needed
to finance investment 45 especially for medium size and small companies.  In contrast to
large corporations, small and medium size enterprises have not had access to international
capital markets.  They also have not had  access to long-term lending by commercial
banks as domestic commercial banks, due to the lack of matching funding (they finance
themselves mostly via deposits), do not offer long-term loan products.
73.  Objective. The principal objective of the project was to encourage the holding of
medium and long term securities by investors and longer term lending by prime-rated
commercial banks. This was to be achieved by ensuring liquidity to creditworthy banks in
the event of market developments that cause spikes in interest rates or financial market
interruption.  To  that effect, the facility offered call  options, i. e.  the commitment to
purchase such bonds for prime-rated (best and most creditworthy) banks'  medium term
bonds, which were issued to fund long-term lending for productive investments. 46 Thus,
the backstop facility was to provide a refinancing guarantee for banks that were willing to
lend at longer terms while having to fund themselves at shorter maturities.  Banks could
only exercise the call options in the case of a market-wide event.
74.  Instruments offered  by  Facility.  Initially, the  backstop fund  was  to  offer  a
contingent backstop option to eligible commercial banks for a bond issue that financed
eligible loans. 47 Loans eligible for a  backstop commitment had  a maximum  size of
US$50 million and a minimum maturity of one year.  To limit the facility's exposure to
43  Habeck,  1994.  The  World  Bank,  Report  No.  P-6193-AR,  P-6161-AR,  12328-AR,  12963-AR.
Pension  security  reform  and mutual  fund laws did help to establish  the prerequisites  for the creation  of an
institutional  investor  base.
45  A study  in 1994  estimated  that the then newly  privatized  entities  alone  would  need  over US$  three  billion  in
long-term  funds  if their  investment  requirements  are  to be met.
46  The  BF was  also  expected  to help strengthen  local market  institutions,  such  as national  credit  rating  agencies,
bring about the development  of standardized  debt securities,  and develop  institutional  skills  and capacities  within  the
capital  market. See for  more  details:  Implementation  Completion  Report,  Washington,  1998.
47  Under  the backstop  facility,  a participating  bank would  make  long-term  US$  investment  loans (TEL)  funded
by its deposit  base, its equity,  and shorter  term US$  denominated  debentures.  The  debentures  could  be bullet  bonds  or
extendable  bonds. To match  the maturities  of its assets  and liabilities,  the participating  bank  could purchase  a backstop
option  from  the Fund. If the participating  bank purchased  a back-stop  contract  and remained  financially  sound  but the
bonds were not refinanced  in the market  in part or whole,  the participating  bank could issue to the Fund within  a
specified  period  bonds  to replace  those  bonds  that  were  not refinanced.  The  principal  amount  of the bonds  to be bought
by the Fund  would  be capped  at the lowest  of (i) the amount  of the backstop  commitment;  (ii) the principal  amount  of
the bonds  originated  during  a specified  period  after  the backstop  commitment  date  and maturing  at such time;  and (iii)
the principal  amount  of the term adjustment  loans  originated  during  the origination  period.28  Why Infrastructure Financing Facilities Often Fall Short of Their Objectives
financial risk and to mitigate adverse selection, 48 banks had to  be in compliance with
certain financial performance indicators and their obligations had to have been rated as
high quality by two domestic rating agencies in  order to  have access to  the backstop
facilities. 49 Furthermore, while the call option was to guarantee that the facility would
refinance these bonds in case of financial market interruption when the bank could not
refinance the backstopped bonds in the market in part or in whole, the institution would
only be able to exercise the option if it continued to comply with a number of financial
performance criteria and if its credit rating did not deteriorate considerably as certified by
two local credit agencies.  Only commercial bank debentures were to be backstopped;
corporate issues were to be insured by the private market.
75.  The original concept of the facility had been developed over several years and was
implemented during the  third quarter of  1994.  However, at  that  point  the Mexico
"tequilla crisis" occurred and the Argentine financial markets were not insulated from the
contagion effect bringing financial market activity, or the issuance of new bonds to a halt
and rendering the facility's instruments useless.  To generate business for the facility the
concept of the facility was altered. Institutions now no longer had to issue "new" paper to
be eligible for backstop commitments but could also use the facility to refinance existing
loans.  Banks would get financing of up to a year if they exercised this "new type of call
option". 50
76.  Pricing.  The original intention was to allocate backstop commitments at prices
that reflect market demand (subject to certain concentration and exposure limits).  It was
envisioned that the Fund  would develop  auction procedures, modified  option pricing
models  and  other  procedures  and  methodologies  as  appropriate,  to  price  backstop
commitments in a market based fashion.  In the end, however, prices were determined
more by market demand rather than by reference to the theoretical model.
77.  Institutional Framework. The Backstop fund was set up as a  temporary single
purpose  entity  with  public  ownership.51  Day-to-day  management  including  the
determination of  commitment fees  and  interest rates  on  the  instrument,  the  sale of
backstop bonds, collection of funds or other amounts due to the Fund, and the investment
of non-committed funds was bestowed on Banco de Inversion y Commercio Exterior
48  As will  be discussed  below,  the backstop  commitments  were supposed  to be auctioned  off. In order to avoid
adverse  selection  in the auction process (risky banks willing to bid up prices), eligibility  criteria needed to be
established  that ensured  that banks  participating  in the auction  were  sound.
49  Nevertheless,  domestic  rating agencies  were  not very  credible. Fourteen  institutions  were competing  against
each other  in a marketplace  where  rating  was  mandatory  and international  rating agencies  stated  that some  inflation  of
rating  did exist.
50  The instrument  was restructured  further. While the original  project concept  envisioned  European  options
(under  which  the option  can only  be exercised  at a pre-specific  date), the options  offered  by the facility  were  switched
to American  options  which  altered  the design  of the instrument  quite considerably  and made  it more  of a liquidity  than
a refinance  instrument.
51  Under  the World  Bank  loan agreement,  the closing  date  would  be in year 12.29  Why Infrastructure Financing Facilities Often Fall Short of Their Objectives
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(BICE).52 Moreover, BICE was also responsible for screening and certifying financial
institutions' access to the facility.
78.  Funding Base and Leverage of Facility.  At the outset, the Fund's  sole funding
base was to be proceeds of a World Bank US$500 million loan to the Government. 53
Furthermore, at least initially, the Fund's backstop commitments at any one time were not
to exceed the sum of cash and cash equivalents owned freely by the fund and the size of
the World Bank loan. 54
79.  Activities/Results.  The Fund  was officially  launched  on August  9, 1995. However,
demand for the instrument was limited.  Only US$200 million were committed within a
year, a relatively small sum in Argentina. 55 The limited demand was mainly dues to the
spillover  effects  of  the  "tequilla  crisis"  which  changed  the  economic  situation
dramatically and bond issuance by financial institutions came to a virtual standstill.  Even
after the change in instrument structure that allowed banks to use the facility to backstop
the refinancing of their existing loans, 56 demand remained subdued.  On a more general
level, stronger banks  seemed reluctant to  use the backstop facility because they were
concerned that that would signal to market participants that they were in a financially
weak position. Hence, the facility was canceled in March 1997.
80.  Lessons Learned.  The Argentine case study exemplifies, among others,  four
issues policymakers will have to take into consideration when setting up infrastructure
financing facilities. These are the: (i) risk inherent in rigid and narrowly defined products
in a rapidly moving and volatile developing economy, (ii) risk of inadequate management
of facility, (iii) risk of weak government ownership, and (iv) risk of perverse signaling
effects.
81.  First, the backstop instrument was designed in  a way that limited its potential
demand thus its  potential market  impact. 57 This  specialized, narrowly  targeted and
rigidly  defined  product  was  ill  suited  for  a  rapidly  changing  and  volatile  market
environment. As a case in point, by the time the facility opened its door, for a number of
52  BICE could also make recommendations to change the design of the backstop facility (including expanding
the nature, term or type of permissible bonds under the backstop commitment) or to introduce new instruments aimed
at promoting the development of a liquid bond market.
53  However, only US$200 million were made available.  The World Bank provided a complimentary TA loan
that  had  three  objectives:  (i)  to  finance  improvements  in  capital  market  supervision  and  regulation  including
enforcement; (ii) to assist in the training of commercial banks to undertake project financing; and (iii) assist in the
implementation of the new, recently approved pension system
54  If the Fund were to be leverage at a later point in time (e. g. if the sovereign debt issue continue to improve in
quality and if the project works well), there was consideration given to asking private foreign commercial banks if they
were prepared to make a contingent letter of credit available for the obligations incurred by the Fund.
55  Worldbank disbursement amounted to US$106.4 million or about 21% of the Loan.  See Implementation
Report, 1998.
56  The original idea of backstopping intervention to encourage longer maturities was partly surrendered with the
american option, weakening its insurance coverage on longer term lending and bond issuance.
57  As mentioned, tenures, amount and eligibility were specified in detail.  The cap of US$50 million (which was
in line with the objective of targeting small borrowers) made it less interesting for  the larger and stronger banks.
Moreover, to mitigate moral hazard and adverse selection, only highly rated commercial banks (as it tumed out one out
of five) were eligible limiting the demand of the instrument.31  Why Infrastructure Financing Facilities Often Fall Short of Their Objectives
different  reasons  - new  type  of  instrument,  lack  of  government  ownership  - the
development of the facility had taken four years, the Mexican peso crisis had occurred
and banks' bond issuance, the raw material for the facility, had come to a virtual standstill
rendering the instrument almost useless. 58
82.  Notwithstanding the fact that the change in macro-conditions was the main factor
in  the  cancellation of  the  facility,  inadequate implementation  capacity,  insufficient
government ownership and  the risk of  adverse signaling also  hampered the efficient
operation of the facility.  The fund management may have lacked the required skills to
handle and market the facility's products and the management of the facility remained
unsatisfactory especially with regards to process and controls.
83.  Many government  officials  tended to  be  skeptical about  the value  of  public
support to back-stop prime rate commercial banks and the stated long-term beneficial
capital markets effects, as well as the actual functioning of the fund.  All this translated
into a slow progress in  developing the facility.  Finally, there was a powerful, though
unintended constraint on participation by strong banks: accessing BF, a public market
institution, was feared by strong banks to provide a perverse market signaL 59 They were
concerned that their making use of facility's instruments would have a negative signaling
effect, indicating to market participants that they were in a financially vulnerable position.
E.  Moldova: "Pre-Export  Guarantee Facility (PEGF)" 60
84.  Rationale and  Objectives.  In the mid 1990s, Moldovan exporting firms faced
severe financing constraints as neither the local banking system nor export credit agencies
offered them working capital financing. 6'  Many foreign traders and input suppliers had
indicated that they would be willing to cover the commercial risk of supplying inputs on
credits if the Government could credibly guarantee that it would not change regulations
and rules retro-actively, regulations and rules which may adversely affect the repayment
capacity of their borrowers.  Against this background, the PEGF  had a developmental
objective and was established to provide a credible guarantee'  against country and political
risk  to  enable  viable  local  firms  to  attract foreign  private  financing  for  pre-export
financing.
85.  Sectors Targeted/lInstrument/Risk  Targeted.  The guarantee was targeted at import
supply companies, commercial lenders, and trading companies and provided coverage
against political risk.  It was to cover damages caused by government actions or inaction
58  The development of the instrument was also not based on a thorough capital market and demand analysis that
could have provided some guidance for the design of the instrument and the actual demand.  See Implementation
Completion Report (1998).
59  A survey carried of potential clients carried out by Salomon Brothers found a "poor perception of banks that
do participate".  Implementation Completion Report.
60  See for more detail: Onno Ruhl, Alfred Watkins, "A Pre-Export Guarantee Facility in Moldova - Mitigating
Political Risk in Transition", The World Bank, Public Policy fir the Private Sector, Note No.64, December 1995.  The
World Bank, Report No. P-6502 MD, 1995.
61  If export credit  agencies provide  cover they require  a full  govemment counterguarantee covering both
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specified  in  the  contract  including:  (i)  inconvertibility or  inability  to  transfer,  (ii)
cancellation of licenses and restrictions of import and exports; and imposition or increase
of import or export taxes, (iii) seizure of goods or prevention of sale, (iv) political force
majeure, and (v) diversion of voyage. 62
86.  The private  sector  participants were  to  bear the  full  commercial risk  of  the
transaction.  This on the one hand insulated the facility against commercial risk and on
the other hand maintained the incentives for banks to appraise and manage commercial
risks. The guarantee was to be available on a first come first serve basis.
87.  Prospective guarantee holders would file an application that contains a detailed
description of the transaction with the facility.  The staff would then verify that the (i)
transaction is  not  on  the  World Bank  negative  list of  prohibited  activities,  (ii) the
transaction complies  with  environmental  standards, (iii)  the  inputs  will  be  used  for
investments or  to  produce exports,  (iv)  the  maturity of  the  proposed  transaction is
consistent with the production cycle or repayment capacity of the enterprise, and (v) the
World Bank has issued a non-objection.  If the transactions fulfill all requirement and
sufficient capacity exists under pre-export facility, the staff would recommend that the
General Manager issue the Guarantee.  The decision to  issue the guarantee would be
rendered within thirty days of the time of application.  If a guarantee is issued, an agent
bank employed by the guarantee administration unit issues standby letters of credit to
accompany each guarantee contract sold by the unit.  If a claim must be  paid and the
government does not remit funds to the agent bank by the payment deadline, the agent
bank  can draw funds from the World Bank loan facility, to  which it has irrevocably
access.  Funds used to pay guarantees would be permanently deducted from the facility,
reducing the amount of future government guarantees that could be issued with World
Bank support. To prevent one or two guarantee holders from monopolizing the available
coverage under the FGC, the maximum amount of guarantees that could be outstanding at
any time was US$4 million; to provide access to smaller firms the minimum guarantee
size was US$25,000.
88.  Pricing. The fee for the guarantee was to be set at level aimed at minimizing input
suppliers' reliance on the guarantee facility and was to be set at 300 basis points per year
or any part thereof of the covered amount of the transaction.  The level was comparable
with fees  for political  risk  coverage charged by MIGA and  by  private  insurers that
provided political risk coverage. 63
89.  Institutional Set Up/Funding  Base. To operate the facility, the Government
established the Guarantee Administration Unit (GAU),64  a government owned entity, as
62  Under the framework of  the guarantee, the guarantee holder would be  required to notify the  guarantee
administration unit thirty days before filing a claim. During the 30 days "cure" period, the government would have an
opportunity to correct the actions that triggered the potential claim.  If the problem is corrected no payment would be
made.
63  The fees were to be paid in US$.
64  The GAU was designed not to be attached to any Govermment  agency as wide representations of agencies
were envisioned to be represented on the board.  This was meant to ensure active involvement of all the agencies in the
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contact with business  people. However,  in effect  the GAU  was effectively  operated  as part of the Department  of
Foreign Economic  Relations  with only marginal  involvement  of representatives  of other government  agencies.
Consequently,  valuable  business  contacts  were lost. Moreover,  it appears  that business  contacts  heard contradictory
stories  from  different  Government  officials  on the availability  of guarantees.34  Why Infrastructure Financing Facilities Often Fall Short of Their Objectives
the executive body to issue political risk insurance.  The GAU was backstopped by a
World Bank loan facility to enhance the credibility of the risk coverage.  The withdrawal
authority for the World Bank loan was delegated to an international bank (ING Bank of
the  Netherlands).  ING  was to  issue  a  letter of  credit  to  each  individual guarantee
holder. 65 The World Bank loan facility that backstopped the GAU amounted to  about
US$30 million. It was expected that this credit line would backstop guarantees of up to a
total of US$150 million. 66
90.  Activities.  There was little demand for political risk insurance after the PEGF was
established in October 1995.  To assess future demand, a demand survey was conducted
in March 1997.  The survey indicated that demand would remain very sluggish in the
future and consequently the facility was canceled in May 1997.
91.  With hindsight, there are mainly four reasons why the facility generated little
demand.  First, the PGF faced demand from the Moldovan Government unconditional
(broader) and  heavily subsidized guarantees in the  areas expected to  be  its  principle
market, namely foreign supply of agricultural inputs in return for part of the following
season's supply; and machinery and equipment sales to the agro processing industry. The
situation was compounded by the fact that structural reforms slowed down, especially in
the agrosector the sector that the instrument primarily targeted. 67
92.  Secondly, there was very little borrowing activity from commercial sources by
private  Moldovan enterprises as most  of  the financing  was provided by  multilateral
agencies ineligible for  accessing political risk  coverage.  Thirdly, the  pricing of the
instruments appears to have been too high to generate demand because the reference price
that was used to determine the price of the guarantee was based on risk premia for long-
term projects and thus  provided an inadequate point of comparison. 6 Fourthly,  the
Moldovan  economy may have been  too  small to  generate adequate demand  for the
facility.
93.  Lessons  Learned.  Three  main  lessons  can  be  drawn  from  the  Moldovan
experience: For a fund/facility to be  successful it is crucial for the government (i) to
adequately and  accurately assess  reasons for  market  failure,  design  instruments that
65  Moreover,  during the  start up phase  of the  facility, ING worked with the staff of  the  GAU to devise
procedures for issuing letters of guarantees, paying claims, and sharing information about pending claims and pending
guarantee applications.
66  The live of the World Bank facility was limited to five years which to a certain extent ensured that the facility
be of a transitional nature.
67  The marketing of the facility's  instrument appears  to have been hampered by confusion  created among
different government agencies. The GAU was designed not to be attached to any specific Government agency and thus
a wide representation of agencies was to be represented on the board of the facility.  This was meant to ensure that all
agencies represented on the board would be actively involved in the marketing of the facility from all Government
officials who are in regular contact with business people.  Despite these intentions, the GAU was effectively operated
as part of the Department of Foreign Economic Relations with only marginal involvement of representatives of other
govemment agencies. Consequently, valuable business contacts were lost.  Moreover, it appears that business contacts
heard contradictory stories from different Govermment  officials on the availability of guarantees.
6S  The price for political risk coverage may have also appeared high to market participants as they perceived
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address  and  mitigate  market  failure  and  ensure  that  there  is  demand  for  such  an
instrument,  (ii) to  pursue overall consistent government policies,  and  (iii) to  get the
pricing parameters of the instruments right.
94.  As the Pakistan and India case already illustrated, the government should conduct
a thorough demand analysis that is aimed at:
*  Assessing impediments to private participation (in the Moldovan case: why
are foreign banks not providing working capital to Moldovan enterprises; and
is there a lack of foreign capital);
*  Providing  guidance  on  the  design  of  the  instrument  that  could  possibly
mitigate the market failure (in the Moldovan case: would foreign banks be
offering working capital to Moldovan firms? Or are foreign banks reluctant to
offer  financing  because  of  commercial  risks  or  other  factors?  What
institutions are currently providing working capital and at what prices (market
based; non-market based?)
*  Identifying demand (in the Moldovan case: if political risk insurance were to
be  offered would there be  demand for it?  Is there any other entity (be it
private or public) that offers similar instrument?  If so, does the government
have any comparative advantage to offer this instrument?)
*  Evaluating the overall consistency and adequacy of government policy (in the
Moldovan case: is there any other government program that offers guarantees
to  this  sector  of  the  economy?  At  what  prices?  Is  the  success  of  the
instrument contingent on the implementation of structural changes?).
95.  In Moldova, a  demand survey would have revealed that most  of the working
capital  financing  was  being  provided by  multi-lateral  institutions  (thus  demand  for
political risk insurance would be limited), that the facility would be crowded out by the
Government's  own  guarantee  program  if  the  government  did  not  discontinue  the
program, and that demand would be sluggish to begin with because the Government had
stalled on structural reforms.
96.  Finally, the Moldovan case study highlights the importance of an adequate pricing
policy for the facilities' instruments. This is, however, not an easy undertaking especially
in the case of contingent instruments, the prices of which basically have to be derived
from  complex option price models.  If reference prices are used, the Moldovan case
illustrates that it is important to ensure that the employed reference price matches the
main features of the instruments offered in terms of maturity and types of risk covered.36  Why Infrastructure Financing Facilities Often Fall Short of Their Objectives
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Bailey,  M. J.  and  M.  C.  Jensen.  (1972).  "Risk  and  the  Discount  Rate  for  Public
Investment". in: M. J. Jensen (Ed.). Studies in the Theory of  Capital Markets. Praeger
Publishers: New York.
Dailami,  Monsoor  and  Michael  Klein.  (1997).  "Government  Support  to  Private
Infrastructure Projects in  Emerging Markets". in: T.  Irwin, Michael  Klein. Guillermo
Perry. Mateen Thobani. Dealing with Public Risk in Private Infrastructure. World Bank
1997.
Dailami, Mansoor.  Danny Leipziger (1997). "Infrastructure Projects and Capital Flows,
A New Perspective". The World Bank. Policy Research Working Paper. December.
Duddy, John A.  (1996).  "Managing Risks Inherent in  Infrastructure Projects".  The
Financier: ACTM, Vol. 3, No. 1., February 1996.
Engel,  E..  R.  Fischer  and  A.  Galetovic.  (1998).  "Infrastructure  Franchising  and
Government Liabilities". In: T. Irwin. Michael Klein. Guillermo Perry. Mateen Thobani.
Dealing with Public Risk in Private Infrastructure, World Bank.
Habeck, Odo. (1994). "Backstop Lending for Capital Market Development in Argentina".
The World Bank, FPD Note No. 29, November.
Hoffmann-Buchardi, Ulrike. Michael  Klein, and  Ignacio Mas.  (1996). "The  Role of
Governments in the Private Provision of Infrastructure". Mimeo. World Bank. June.
Gopinath, Deepak. "A Second Opinion". Infrastructure Finance.  February 1997.
Klein,  Michael. (1997). "Managing  Guarantee Programs in  Support of  Infrastructure
Investments". The World Bank, Policy Research Working Paper 1812, August.
Klein, Michael (1996). "Risk, Taxpayer, and the Role of Government in Project Finance."
Policy Research Working Paper 1688. World Bank, December 1996.
Klein,  Michael.  Jae  So,  and  Ben  Shin,  (1996).  'Transaction  Costs  in  Private
Infrastructure Projects - Are They Too High?". Viewpoint, The World Bank Group, Note
No. 95, October 1996.
Klein, Michael  and  Neil  D. Roger.  (1994).  "Back  to  the  Future: The  Potential in
Infrastructure Privatization". Finance and the International Economy. Vol. 8, 1994.
Kohli, Harinder. Ashoka Mody, and Michael Walton (Eds). (1997)  Choices for Private
Infrastructure Provision in East Asia. The World Bank, Washington.37  Why Infrastructure Financing Facilities Often Fall Short of Their Objectives
Lewis, Ch. M. and A. Mody. (1998). "The Management of Contingent Liabilities: A Risk
Management  Framework  for  National  Governments".  in:  T.  Irwin.  Michael  Klein.
Guillermo Perry. Mateen Thobani. Dealing with Public Risk in Private  Infrastructure,
World Bank.
Mody, Ashoka and Dilip Patro.  (1996). Methods of Loan Guarantee Valuation  and
Accounting. The World Bank, Mimeo.
Ruhl,  Onno and  Alfred  Watkins,  "A  Pre-Export  Guarantee Facility in  Moldova  -
Mitigating Political Risk in Transition". The World Bank.  Public Policy for  the Private
Sector. Note No.64. December 1995.
Swafford, David (1997). "Vaulting the Sovereign Ceiling." Latin Finance. No. 87, 1997.
Wilson, R. (1982). "Risk Management of Public Projects". in: R. C. Lind. Discounting
for Time and Risk in Energy Policy. Resources for the Future.
The World Bank. (1998). Report No. 17154-Co.  January.
The World Bank, Report No. P-6347-PAK.
The World Bank, Report No. P-7226-PAK.
The World Bank, Report No. P-4807-PAK.
The World Bank, Report No. P-6193-AR.
The World Bank, Report No. P-6161-AR.
The World Bank, Report No. 12963-AR.
The World Bank.  (1998). "Moldova: Pre-Export Guarantee Facility."  Implementation
Completion Report. Draft. Washington.
The  World  Bank.  (1998).  "Argentina:  Capital  Market  Development  Project."
Implementation Completion Report. Draft. Washington.
The World Bank. (1998). "Colombia: Private Infrastructure Financing Facility". Project
Appraisal Report. Draft. Washington.
The World Bank. (1998).  Report No. 1754-CO.
The World Bank. (1997). "Facilitating Private Involvement in Infrastructure: An Action
Program". World Bank.38  Why Infrastructure Financing Facilities Often Fall Short of Their Objectives
World Bank (1996).  Infrastructure Development in East Asia  and Pacific: Toward a
New Public-Private Partnership.
The World Bank. (1995). Report No. P-6502 MD.
The World Bank.  (1994). "Infrastructure for Development." World Development Report.
Washington.Policy  Research Working Paper Series
Contact
Title  Author  Date  for paper
WPS2340  Currency  Substitution  in Latin  Pere  Gomis-Porqueras  May  2000  M. Puentes
America:  Lessons  from  the 1990s  Carlos  Serrano  39621
Alejandro  Somuano
WPS2341  The  Tyranny  of Concepts:  CUDIE  Lant Pritchett  May  2000  R. Widuri
(Cumulated,  Depreciated  Investment
Effort)  Is Not Capital
WPS2342  What  Can  We Learn  about  Country  Martin  Ravallion  May  2000  P. Sader
Performance  from  Conditional  33902
Comparisons  across  Countries?
WPS2343  Ownership  and Performance  of  David  A. Grigorian  May  2000  D. Brown
Lithuanian  Enterprises  33542
WPS2344  Designing  Direct  Subsidies  for  Vivien  Foster  May  2000  S. Delgado
Water  and  Sanitation  Services:  Andres  G6mez-Lobo  37840
Panama-A Case  Study  Jonathan  Halpern
WPS2345  Information  and  Modeling  Issues  in  Andres  Gomez-Lobo  May  2000  S. Delgado
Designing  Water  and  Sanitation  Vivien  Foster  37840
Subsidy  Schemes  Jonathan  Halpern
WPS2346  The  Middle  Class  Consensus  and  William  Easterly  May  2000  K. Labrie
Economic  Development  31001
WPS2347  Terror  as a Bargaining  Instrument:  Francis  Bloch  May  2000  P.  Sader
A Case  Study  of Dowry  Violence  in  Vijayendra  Rao  33902
Rural  India
WPS2348  Taxing Issues  with Privatization:  Jack M. Mintz  May  2000  G. Chenet-Smith
A Checklist  Duanjie  Chen  36370
Evangelia  Zorotheos
WPS2349  Trade,  Foreign  Direct  Investment,  Kamal  Saggi  May  2000  R. Bonfield
and  International  Technology  31248
Transfer:  A Survey
WPS2350  Multilateral  Trade  Liberalization  and  Maurice  Schiff  May  2000  L.  Tabada
Political  Disintegration:  Implications  36896
for the Evolution  of Free  Trade  Areas
and  Customs  Unions
WPS2351  Environmental  Policy  and  Time  Peter  W.  Kennedy  May  2000  Y. D'Souza
Consistency:  Emissions  Taxes  Benoit  Laplante  31449
and Emissions  TradingPolicy  Research Working  Paper  Series
Contact
Title  Author  Date  for paper
WPS2352 How  Stronger  Patent  Protection  in  Carsten  Fink  May  2000  L.  Tabada
India  Might  Affect  the Behavior  36896
of Transnational  Pharmaceutical
Industries
WPS2353  The Sao  Mateus-Jabaquara  Jorge  Rebelo  May  2000  S. Van Veldhuizen
Trolleybusway  Concession  in Brazil  Pedro  Machado  38722
WPS2354  When  the Bureaucrats  Move  out of  Yi Chen  May  2000  M. Yafi
Business:  A Cost-Benefit  Ishac  Diwan  34649
Assessment  of Labor  Retrenchment
in China
WPS2355 Greed  and  Grievance  in Civil  War  Paul  Collier  May  2000  A. Kitson-Walters
Anke Hoeffler  33712
WPS2356 Bureaucratic  Delegation  and Political  Philip  Keefer  June  2000  P. Sintim-Aboagye
Institutions:  When Are Independent  David  Stasavage  37644
Central  Banks  Irrelevant?
WPS2357 Evaluating  Carbon  Offsets  from  Kenneth  M. Chomitz  June  2000  J. Ancrum
Forestry  and Energy  Projects:  33512
How  Do  They  Compare?